This work elicits the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the nal tally of the votes. In certain situations, like jury voting, this may be undesirable. We present a robust and universally veri able Membership Testing Scheme (MTS) that allows, among other things, a collection of voters to cast votes and determine whether their tally belongs to some pre{speci ed set (e.g., exceeds a given threshold) | our scheme discloses no additional information than that implied from the knowledge of such membership. We discuss several extensions of our basic MTS. All the constructions presented combine features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX{networks and in homomorphic encryption.
Introduction
In a typical trial by jury in the United States, twelve jurors deliberate in private. A foreman appointed by the judge among the jurors presides the deliberations. Jurors might be called upon to decide on several di erent counts according to a policy which may be complicated. Nevertheless, the simplest and most important jury verdicts are of the binary type, e.g., innocent/guilty. In criminal cases unanimity is required in order to reach a verdict. In civil cases there are di erent standards, nine out of twelve votes are representative numbers. Jury deliberations proceed in discussion rounds followed by voting rounds. Voting is performed by raising hands. Hence, a typical requirement of an election protocol, privacy of the votes, is not achieved. This opens the possibility of biases on decisions due to jurors fear of rejection, a posteriori reprisals by interested parties, and/or follow the leader kind of behavior. In fact, just knowledge of tallies can cause undesirable consequences like follow the pack kind of behavior among jurors.
A ballot box system could be implemented in order to guarantee privacy. A subset of the jury might be held responsible for tallying the votes and communicating to the others whether a verdict has been reached. Still, this discloses the nal tally to a subset of the jury and allows them to manipulate the deliberation process. An outside third party (e.g., a judge, government employee, etc.) could be responsible for tallying the votes, but this would cast doubts on the whole process since it allows for outside jury manipulation, could cause undesirable leaks on how the jury is leaning, etc. We provide an electronic drop in procedure for jury voting in the presence of a curious media, interested parties, dishonest court employees, and con ictive jury members, that reveals nothing besides whether the nal tally exceeds or not a given threshold value.
We stress that we do not question the adequacy of the way in which juries deliberate. There are good reasons to encourage jurors to express clearly and openly their opinions. The point is that the way in which juries deliberate is just one familiar example, among many, where it is clear that the voting procedure itself has an e ect on the nal outcome. In particular, our work is motivated by the observation that voting procedures that disclose nal tallies may be undesirable. This situation occurs when small groups wish to reach by majority vote a yes/no type decision on a particular issue: e.g., whether to accept or reject a paper submitted to a cryptology conference | the cryptographers program committee problem, to con rm or not someone as president of a committee or chair of a department, a program committee deciding whether or not to send an invitation to a speaker, business partners trying to decide whether to go forth with a given investment.
The rst electronic voting scheme proposals focused on trying to break the correspondence between the voters and the vote casted. Afterwards, several other desirable properties of electronic voting schemes (besides correctness, privacy, and e ciency) were identi ed, e.g., robustness, availability, non{duplication, universal veri ability, non{coercibility. Electronic voting protocols satisfying di erent subsets of the latter properties were designed. Nevertheless, all of them reveal the nal vote tally. In this work we propose a cryptographic procedure for addressing this problem and stress its relevance by describing a di erent application.
Before presenting this work's contributions we begin by discussing past work.
Related work
Voting schemes where one wants only one bit of information regarding the outcome, like the ones discussed in the previous section, can be cast in the framework of secure multi{party computation. Thus, plausibility results, asserting that such voting schemes can be in principle constructed, can be obtained. Indeed, the application of general secure multi{party computation techniques like the ones proposed in GMW86, CCD87, BGW88] yield such constructions. Unfortunately, they yield constructions that do not exhibit some of the properties one desires of an electronic voting scheme (e.g., non{interaction among voters). Electronic voting schemes are one of the prime examples of secure multi{party computation. Thus, it is not surprising that they have been intensively studied. The rst electronic election scheme in the literature was proposed by Chaum Cha81] . His work is based on a realization of a computational secure anonymous channel called the MIX{network. Anonymous channels and election schemes are closely related. Indeed, an anonymous channel hides the correspondence between senders and receivers. An election scheme requires hiding the correspondence between the voters and their votes. Since Chaum's Cha81] work, several electronic election scheme proposals based on untraceability networks have been described in the literature, among the earlier ones see Cha88, Boy89, PIK93, SK95] . More recent proposals of these type are those of Abe Abe98], Jakobsson Jak98, Jak99], and Jakobsson and Juels JJ99]. (For actual implementations of MIX{ networks see SGR97] and the references therein.)
In contrast to the schemes mentioned in the previous paragraph, the ones introduced in CF85, BY86, Ben87] do not rely on the use of anonymous channels. In these schemes ballots are distributed over a number of tallying authorities through a special type of broadcast channel. Rather than hiding the correspondence between the voter and his ballot, the value of the vote is hidden. Among This work's rst contribution is that it elicits the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the nal tally of the votes. As discussed above this may be undesirable in some situations. Our main technical contribution is a cryptographic protocol to which we refer as Membership Testing Scheme (MTS). Given a xed sequence of integers c 1 ; : : : ; c n and sets S 1 ; : : : ; S n , it allows a collection of parties P 1 ; : : : ; P n to cast values v 1 ; : : : ; v n , where v i 2 S i , and determine whether P i c i v i belongs to some pre{speci ed set S.
Based on our MTS we obtain a drop in replacement electronic procedure for a civil case jury voting protocol by letting n = 12, c 1 = : : : = c n = 1, S 1 = : : : = S n = f0; 1g, and S = f9; 10; 11; 12g (simpler schemes can be devised for criminal type trials, so we will focus on the more challenging civil case type trials). For the sake of simplicity of exposition, throughout we informally discuss our results in the terminology of jury systems. Thus, for notational and mnemonic purposes we refer to parties P 1 ; : : : ; P n as voters and denote them by V 1 ; : : : ; V n , to the values v 1 ; : : : ; v n , as votes, and to P i c i v i as the tally.
The schemes we propose satisfy some subset of the following properties:
Eligibility: Only authorized voters can vote. No one can vote more than once. Correctness: If all participants are honest, the correct output will be generated. Robustness: The system can recover from the faulty or malicious behavior of any (reasonably sized) coalition of participants.
Computational Privacy: A voter ballot's content will be kept secret from any (reasonably sized) coalition of parties that does not include the voter.
Universal Verifiability: Ensures that any party, including a passive observer, can check that ballots are correctly cast, only invalid ballots are discarded, and the published nal tally is consistent with the correctly cast ballots.
No{duplication: No one can duplicate anyone else's vote. Receipt{Freeness: No voter can prove to a third party that he/she has cast a particular vote. In our scheme the voters send in a ballot identical to those proposed in CGS97], i.e., an ElGamal ciphertext representing his/her vote plus a proof that the ciphertext is indeed a valid ballot. Hence, as in CGS97], both the computational and communicational complexity of the voter's protocol is linear in the security parameter k | thus optimal. 1 Moreover, for any reasonable security parameter, the voters' protocol remains the same even if the number of voters varies. The work performed by each authority is O((mjSj + n)k). Moreover, the computational complexity of verifying each authority's work is proportional to the work performed by each authority. As in CGS97] the work needed to verify that a voter sent in a well formed ballot is O(k), per voter.
Our MTS proposal combines features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX{networks (a la Cha81]) and in homomorphic encryption schemes (a la CF85, BY86, Ben87]). We use homomorphic (ElGamal) encryption in order to hide the vote tallies. We rely on special properties of the ElGamal cryptosystem in order to perform an equality test between the tally and members of S. We use MIX{networks (ElGamal based) in order to hide the value of the member of S involved in each equality test. To the best of our knowledge, the only other cryptographic scheme which relies on homomorphic encryption schemes and MIX{ networks is the recently proposed scheme of Hirt and Sako HS00]. But, our MTS combines both theses schemes in a novel way. Indeed, Hirt and Sako's proposal uses a MIX{network in order randomly permute, for each voter, potential ballots. Our MTS relies on MIX{networks in order to randomly permute the elements of the pre{speci ed set S on which one desires to test membership.
The applications we provide for our MTS constitute novel uses of MIX{networks. A feature of these applications is that they rely on the capacity, that the overwhelming majority of MIX{ network proposals exhibit, to randomly permute and encrypt a list of ElGamal ciphertexts. On the contrary, they do not use the decryption capabilities that accompany most MIX{network proposals.
We propose several implementations of a MTS. Our rst proposal relies on the homomorphic encryption based electronic election scheme of Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers CGS97] and the MIX{network of Abe Abe98]. We also discuss alternative implementations of our MTS based on the work of Jakobsson and Desmedt and Kurosawa Jak98, DK00] as opposed to that of Abe Abe98]. Our di erent MTS implementations exhibit di erent properties depending on the previous work we use to build them.
Organization
In Sect. 2, we discuss the building blocks on which our basic MTS proposal relies. In Sect.
3, we describe and analyze our MTS and use it for building an electronic drop in replacement for a jury voting protocol that reveals nothing besides the fact that the nal tally exceeds or not a given threshold. In Sect. 5 and Sect. 6 we discuss variants and other applications of our basic scheme. We conclude in Sect. 7 discussing a feature of all of the MTSs that we propose and some desirable future developments.
Preliminaries
We work in the same model introduced by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87, CGS97] , where participants are divided into n voters V 1 ; : : : ; V n and m authorities A 1 ; : : : ; A m called active parties.
Al parties are limited to have polynomial{bounded computational resources and have access to a so called bulletin board whose characteristics we describe below.
In the sequel we assume that a designated subset of active participants on input 1 k where k is a security parameter, jointly generate the following system parameters: large k bit long primes p and q such that q divides p ? 1, and generators g and h of a multiplicative subgroup G q of order q of Z p . One way of collectively generating these system parameters is letting participants run a copy of the same probabilistic algorithm, where the algorithm's coin ips are generated mutually at random.
Conventions: Henceforth, unless otherwise speci ed, all arithmetic is performed modulo p except for arithmetic involving exponents which is performed modulo q. Throughout this paper, x 2 R means that x is chosen uniformly at random from . Furthermore, negligible and overwhelming probability correspond to probabilities that are at most (k) and 1 ? (k) respectively, where (k) is a function vanishing faster than the inverse of any polynomial in the security parameter k. A non{negligible probability is said to be signi cant.
Building Blocks
Bulletin board: The communication model used in our MTS consists of a public broadcast channel with memory, usually referred too in the literature as bulletin board. All messages that pass through this communication channel can be observed by any party including passive observers. Nobody can erase, alter, nor destroy any information. Every active participant can post messages in his own designated section of a bulletin board. This requires the use of digital signatures to control access to distinct sections of the bulletin board. Here we assume a public{key infrastructure is already in place. This su ces for computational security. Note that it is implicitly assumed that denial{of{service attacks are excluded from consideration (see CGS97] for a discussion of how to implement a bulletin board in order to achieve this). The rst DKG protocol was proposed by Pedersen Ped91] . Henceforth in this work, DKG refers to the protocol presented in GJKR99] and shown to be secure in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt up to t < n=2 parties.
ElGamal Encryption and Robust (threshold) Proof of Equality of Encryptions:
Our MTS relies on a robust threshold version of the ElGamal cryptosystem ElG85] proposed in CGS97]. Recall that in ElGamal's cryptosystem the sender chooses r 2 R Z q , and encrypts the message m 2 G q as ( ; ) = (g r ; y r m) where y = g s is the public key and s is the secret key. In a robust threshold version of the ElGamal cryptosystem, the secret key and public key are jointly generated by the intended ciphertext recipients by means of a DKG protocol like the one described above.
A robust threshold ElGamal cryptosystem has a feature on which all our MTS proposals rely. This property allows checking whether a ciphertext encodes the plaintext 1 without either decrypting the message nor reconstructing the secret s. Indeed, assume ( ; ) is an ElGamal encryption of message m, that is ( ; ) = (g r ; y r m). Verifying whether it is an encryptions of 1 message boils down to checking the following relations: 1. Participant j posts ! j = s j and proves in zero knowledge that log g y j = log ! j using the Chaum and Pedersen CP92] protocol for equality of discrete logs described in Appendix A. The protocol is honest{veri er zero{knowledge CGS97]. This, su ces for our application. In order to make the protocol non{interactive the Fiat{Shamir heuristic is used. This requires a cryptographically strong hash function. We henceforth refer to this non{interactive proof as Proof{Log(g; y j ; ; ! j ). We now discuss a proposal by Abe Abe98] for a MIX{network with the characteristics described above that satis es the following properties: correctness, robustness, privacy, and universal veri a- The list of encrypted messages is randomized and permuted by the cascade of MIX{servers.
Server j chooses a random permutation j of S, for each l the sever picks t j;l 2 R Z q , reads ((G j?1;l ; M j?1;l )) l from the bulletin board, and posts in the bulletin board ((G j;l ; M j;l )) l where G j;l = G j?1; j (l) g t j; j (l) ; and M j;l = M j?1; j (l) y t j; j (l) :
Processing proceeds sequentially through all servers. The security of the mix performed by servers relies on the following:
Lemma 1 ( Abe98] ) Under the intractability of the Decision Di e{Hellman problem, given correctly formed ((G j?1;l ; M j?1;l )) l and ((G j;l ; M j;l )) l , no adversary can determine j (l) for any l with probability signi cantly better than 1=jSj.
An additional protocol is executed in order to prove the correctness of randomization and permutation to external veri ers as well as convince honest servers that they have contributed to the output, i.e., no one has canceled the randomization and permutation performed by the honest servers (with success probability signi cantly better than a random guess). For completeness sake we review this protocol as well as a non{interactive version of it in Appendix C. We henceforth refer to this (non{interactive) proof as Proof{ .
Membership Testing Scheme (MTS)
We work in the model described in the previous section where the active set of participants is V 1 ; : : : ; V n (the voters) and A 1 ; : : : ; A m (the authorities). Voters and authorities might overlap.
In what follows, N denotes the cardinality of the set S for which one seeks to verify whether it contains the vote tally. Also, henceforth, i runs over f1; : : : ; ng, j runs over f1; : : : ; mg, and l runs over S. 2. Authority A j chooses at random a permutation j of f1; : : : ; Ng, for each l picks t j;l 2 R Z q , and posts the list ((G j;l ; M j;l )) l such that for each l 2 S, G j;l = G j?1;l g t j; j (l) ; and M j;l = M j?1;l y t j; j (l) : Electronic Jury Voting Protocol: We conclude this section with a simple observation; an electronic analog of a 12{juror civil case voting protocol where 9 votes su ce to reach a verdict can be derived from our Basic MTS by letting n = 12 and S = f9; 10; 11; 13g.
Analysis
Eligibility: The non{anonymity of ballot casting insures that only authorized voters cast ballots. Indeed, recall that voters must identify themselves through digital signatures in order to post their vote onto their designated area of the bulletin board. This also insures that no voter can cast more than one ballot. No{duplication: Follows from the voter speci c challenge in the (non{interactive) proof of validity of ballots. Indeed, recall that each voter computes the challenge in the proof of validity of ballots described in Appendix B as a hash of several values one of which is a unique public key identifying the voter. Robustness: First we observe that robustness with respect to malicious voters is achieved.
Lemma 2 ( CGS97])) An incorrectly formed ballot will be detected with overwhelming probability.
Still, we need to show that the protocol cannot be disrupted by dishonest authorities. We will need the following:
Lemma 3 ( Abe98]) Protocol{ is a honest veri er zero{knowledge proof of knowledge for and m;l 's. The protocol is also honest veri er zero{knowledge proof of knowledge for j 's and t j;l 's held by honest provers. Robustness with respect to malicious authorities is now guaranteed by the following:
Theorem 2 Assume there are at most m ? t ? 1 participating authorities controlled by an adversary. The goal of the adversary is to force the output of the scheme to be incorrect (i.e., to be MEMBER when it should be NON{MEMBER and vice versa). The adversary cannot succeed with non{negligible probability, and the identity of the authorities controlled by the adversary will be learned with overwhelming probability.
Proof: (Sketch) By Lemma 2 it su ces to consider the case were only correctly formed ballots will be accounted for. Let T be the tally of the correctly formed ballots.
Observe that there are at least t honest authorities. Any such collection of authorities will be able to decide correctly whether or not T belongs to S unless ((G m;l ; M m;l )) l is not a permuted ElGamal re{encryption of ((G 0;l ; M 0;l )) l . If the latter holds, then Lemma 3 insures that with overwhelming probability the Veri cation Phase will detect it, the tracing option invoked, and the identity of dishonest authorities exposed.
Theorem 3 Assume there are less than t dishonest authorities and n 0 dishonest voters controlled by an adversary. Let T h and T d be the tally of the correctly emitted ballots among the honest and dishonest voters, respectively. The goal of the adversary is to learn any additional information concerning the votes cast by honest voters, besides that implied by whether or not T h belongs to (S ? T d ) \ f0; : : : ; n ? n 0 g. 2 Under the Di e{Hellman assumption, the adversary has a negligible probability of success.
Proof: (Sketch) By Lemma 2 it su ces to consider the case were only correctly formed ballots will be accounted for.
If an adversary succeeds in learning any additional information besides that implied by whether or not T h belongs to (S ? T d ) \ f0; : : : ; n ? n 0 g, then such an adversary: We now consider case (ii). Let T denote the tally and X l denote the random variable corresponding to the value of the element of S encoded by (G m;l ; M m;l ). We model any prior knowledge about the tally as a known distribution, i.e., we think of T as a random variable of known distribution.
By the end of the Output Phase some information concerning T is revealed. Indeed, in case T 6 2 S, it is determined that X l 6 = T for every l, and in case T 2 S, that X l = T for an l and that X l 6 = T for all l 6 = l . Given that s 0 l is uniformly distributed over Z q and is independent of information revealed is, in case T 6 2 S, that X l 6 = T for every l, and in case T 2 S, that X l = T for an l and that X l 6 = T for all l 6 = l .
We claim that at the end of a successful run of the protocol the only information disclosed concerning X l 's is given by the a posteriori distributions X l =(T 2 S) in case T 2 S, and X l =(T 6 2 S) in case T 6 2 S. Indeed, we know from Theorem 2 that as long as t authorities are honest, the computation is robust. Thus, if a result is declared VALID, then it must be so with an overwhelming probability. This guarantees that the permutation and randomization performed by honest authorities during the MIX Phase was not canceled. So, for any permutation (s l ) l2S of S and arbitrary i, and, P T = ijX l = T; X l 6 = T; 8l 2 S n fl g ] = P T = ijT 2 S ] :
Hence, if during the MIX Phase the adversary can obtain any information besides that implied by whether T belongs or not to S, then a reduction type argument implies that there is an e cient procedure that correlates input elements to output elements of the honest authorities MIX Phase computation. This would contradict the intractability assumption on which the underlying MIX network's security claim relies, i.e., the decision Di e{Hellman problem. If the result of the Veri cation Phase is not declared VALID, then honest authorities will perform the tracing of dishonest authorities. Since both the MIX Phase and Veri cation Phase are independent of the votes cast, this does not disclose any information that allows the adversary to compromise the voters' privacy (even if the Voting Phase is performed, see Remark 1). In case the Veri cation Phase is not declared VALID, then the Output Phase will not be performed and thus no information concerning T h would be leaked (besides that which can be obtained from the ElGamal encryption of T h ).
Universal Verifiability: Follows from the public veri ability of the proofs of ballot validity (Proof{Ballot), the proof of randomization and permutation (Proof{ ), and the proof of knowledge of equality of discrete logarithms (Proof{Log). work during pre-computation. The communicational complexity (in bits) incurred by each authority exceeds the computational complexity by a factor of k.
The computational complexity of verifying the authorities work is proportional to the computational work performed by each authority during the corresponding phase.
Variants
More Efficient and Alternative MTSs: If one is willing to forgo universal veri ability, then more e cient MIX{networks like the one proposed by Jakobsson and Desmedt and Kurosawa Jak98, DK00] might be used instead of Abe's MIX{network in the MTS of Sect. 3. In this case, the work done by each authority during the pre-computation stage is reduced to O((m + k= log N)Nk). In fact, the only essential characteristic our MTS scheme requires from the underlying MIX{network is that it performs a random secret permutation and ElGamal re{encryption of an input list of ElGamal ciphertexts. (The threshold decryption capabilities utilized in the DEx protocol is a feature from the underlying encryption scheme, not of the MIX{network). Thus, other recent MIX{network proposals like those of Jakobsson et al. Jak99, JJ99] are good candidates for drop in replacements in the MIX module of the MTS of Sect. 3. Receipt{Free MTSs: In some situations it might be desirable to ensure that parties involved in the MTS can not sell or be coerced into revealing the values they cast. For example, in electronic jury voting one desires voters can neither sell nor be coerced into disclosing their votes, i.e., the scheme should be receipt{free. Our basic MTS proposal can be enhanced in order to achieve this property. Indeed, it su ces to use Hirt and Sako's HS00] electronic election scheme instead of the one of of Cramer et al. CGS97] . Note that this requires new assumptions, among them, physical assumptions like the existence of secret one{way communication channels from the authorities to the voters. Moreover, the computational work as well as the communication complexity of Hirt and Sako's scheme increases linearly with the number of parties/voters involved.
Applications
Testing Membership of Linear Functions: We can modify our Basic MTS to allow parties P 1 ; : : : ; P n to determine whether their private inputs v i 2 S i , for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, are such that P i c i v i 2 S without revealing P i c i v i . Here, S 1 ; : : : ; S n and S are publicly known subsets of Z q , and c 1 ; : : : ; c n is a publicly available xed sequence of integers. This modi cation of our Basic MTS allows to implement a weighted majority voting electronic election scheme.
Scoring: Consider a person/entity which is willing to answer n very sensitive questions to a group of m evaluators (say for a job interview, insurance application, etc). Assume the i{th question accepts as answer any element of S i . Each evaluator would like to learn whether the weighted score of the answers P i c i a i exceeds a threshold (here again c 1 ; : : : ; c n is a publicly available xed sequence of integers). But, the respondent wishes to keep private the answers to each individual question. This problem clearly reduces to the one discussed in the previous paragraph. Thus, it follows that our Basic MTS can be used to solve it.
Final Comments
An interesting feature of our jury voting scheme is that it combines two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, one based on MIX{networks Cha81] and the other on homomorphic encryptions CF85, BY86, Ben87]. We need homomorphic encryption in order to hide the ballots content and compute the tally while keeping it secret. We need ElGamal based MIX{ networks in order to hide the value of the elements of S to which the ElGamal encryption of the vote tally is compared. It is an interesting challenge to design an electronic jury voting scheme in the model introduced in CF85, BY86, Ben87] which does not rely on MIX{networks. 
C Proof of Randomization and Permutation
We now describe a protocol due to Abe Abe98], denoted Protocol{ , which convinces external veri ers of the correctness of the randomization and permutation. It also convinces honest servers that the permutations they have performed have not been canceled (with non{negligible probability).
